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Abstract This paper examines differences in the ability
to obtain capital—bank loans and trade credit—between
firms, industries, and countries using survey data on
European small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
from 2009 to 2014. The results show that firm age and
firm size are positively linked to SMEs’ access to bank
loans, but only firm size is positively related to the
provision of trade credit. The results also provide em-
pirical support for a complementary rather than a sub-
stitutive effect between bank loans and trade credit.
Manufacturing SMEs have a significantly higher likeli-
hood of receiving bank loans and trade credit than non-
manufacturing SMEs. We find differences across coun-
tries in terms of the relevance of firm age and firm size
for obtaining capital. In addition, we point at specific
country-level variables that explain why obtaining credit
is easier in some countries. We perform additional anal-
yses to confirm our baseline results and provide direc-
tions for future research.
Keywords Bank loans . Trade credit . Information
asymmetry . SMEs
JEL classifications E44 . G32 . G33 . L26
1 Introduction
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which are
defined in the current paper as firms with 250 employees
at most, depend on regular cash inflows to ensure their
survival and growth. It is important to understand the
determinants of their access to credit because SMEs
create the majority of jobs (De Wit and De Kok 2014)
and contribute substantially to the growth of modern
economies (Carree and Thurik 2003). Bank financing
and trade credit are two major sources of SME finance
(Berger and Udell 1998). Because banks are more likely
to provide loans to firms with more assets (Cosh et al.
2009), i.e., to larger firms, SMEs are more dependent on
alternative forms of financing, such as trade credit
(Berger and Udell 1998; Petersen and Rajan 1997). A
trade credit is offered by suppliers when there is a delay
between the provision of goods and/or services and their
actual payment by the SME (Biais and Gollier 1997).
Suppliers have various (non-)financial motivations for
granting trade credit. Trade credit is a way of stimulating
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sales, for example, by offering more favorable terms
with increasing quantities. Trade credit also makes it
possible to construct long-term relationships with cus-
tomers and help them in difficult periods. Furthermore,
it allows customers to evaluate the quality of goods
before paying and therefore is a signal of high standards
(García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano 2010; Klapper
et al. 2012). Firms that supply trade credit have been
found to be more profitable than non-suppliers
(Martínez-Sola et al. 2014).
In an ideal finance marketplace, SMEs with good
projects experience no restrictions to gaining access to
external finance, whereas SMEs with poor projects are
financially restricted. However, when a lender screens a
potential borrower, information asymmetries cannot be
avoided, because the lender is less informed about the
viability of the borrower and its projects than the bor-
rower itself (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Information
asymmetries are thought to be particularly strong for
small and young firms because of their restricted credit
history and track record and their lower ability to pro-
vide collateral.
The present study focuses on bank loans and trade
credit as two often-used sources of finance for SMEs by
examining the SMEs’ direct experiences with bank loan
and trade credit negotiations (Bapplications^).1 Such
direct measures of a firm’s access to bank loan and trade
credit have generally been unavailable. The central con-
cept is debt capacity, which refers to the ability of a firm
to obtain all or part of its demand for debt financing
(Cosh et al. 2009; Levenson andWillard 2000; Ang and
Smedema 2011).2 Debt capacity may have several fi-
nancing sources, such as bank financing and trade cred-
it. Although numerous studies have investigated the
determinants of debt capacity in terms of bank loans,
evidence for the determinants of obtaining trade credit is
much scarcer. We have the following four research aims.
First, we focus on firm size and firm age as
relevant firm-level characteristics that determine
whether a requested bank loan or trade credit is
granted. Debt financing restrictions may be severe
for small and young firms, thereby hindering the
entrepreneurs’ efforts to develop their businesses. It
has been argued that trade credit is a good alterna-
tive source of finance for SMEs (Diamond 1989;
García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano 2010), highlight-
ing the relevance of taking the investigation of trade
credit into account in the context of SMEs.
Second, we focus on whether bank financing and
trade credit should be considered Bcomplements^ or
Bsubstitutes^ (Giannetti et al. 2011; Agostino and
Trivieri 2014). SMEs are inclined to use multiple
sources of finance (Moritz et al. 2016). Trade credit
can be regarded as a substitute for SMEs that cannot
be financed by banks: SMEs that already have ac-
cess to bank loans are less likely to seek access to
trade credit and vice versa (Berger and Udell 1998).
Yet, trade credit can also be considered a comple-
ment: backing by suppliers is a positive signal for a
bank during the screening process of a potential
borrower. It may thus reasonably be asked whether
trade credit is a positive signal that makes banks less
reluctant to lend.
Third, we investigate whether application success
(for bank loans or trade credit) depends on the sector
in which an SME is active. Previous studies (Hall et al.
2000; Taketa and Udell 2007) suggest that sectors may
have a relevant impact on financial choices, and, hence,
that industry differences may be present regarding the
provision of credit. Indeed, Taketa and Udell (2007) find
that the availability of the financing form depends on the
industry in which Japanese SMEs are active.
Fourth, we investigate country differences regard-
ing debt capacity. The presence of country differ-
ences for the success of application outcomes can be
expected for several reasons. For example, Casey
and O’Toole (2014) investigate whether financial
restrictions for SMEs are more severe in countries
that have suffered more profoundly from the crisis,
and they find a high degree of heterogeneity across
countries. In the present paper, we investigate
whether the importance of firm age and firm size
for obtaining credit depends on the country, and we
determine which country-level variables explain ap-
plication success.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in two
ways. First, we empirically investigate firm, industry,
and country differences in the provision of bank loans
and trade credit. We use a proxy for debt capacity based
1 We define Bapplication^ as a situation when a firm enters into
negotiation with a bank to obtain a loan or with a supplier to obtain a
trade credit. However, trade credit negotiations can be informal or
formal, because trade credit is characterized by more informal relation-
ships compared with bank loans.
2 While in this paper we focus on a firm’s access to outside finance,
other studies examine other questions related to debt financing. For
example, Canton et al. (2013) examine perceived financial flexibility
by investigating the expected capacity of a firm to access external
financing.
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on SMEs’ direct experiences with bank loan and trade
credit applications. This approach differs from many
studies on SMEs’ access to finance that tend to concen-
trate on bank loans alone. Second, we unravel the link-
age between bank loan and trade credit applications to
determine whether bank lending and trade credit are
complements or substitutes. To our knowledge, no em-
pirical study conducted in Europe has yet compared
these two forms of financing based on application deci-
sion outcomes. For this purpose, we make use of mul-
tiple observations for an SME across years.
Our analysis is based on 12 waves (2009–2014)
of the SME Access to Finance survey carried out on
behalf of the European Commission. We underline
the importance of distinguishing between bank loans
and trade credit. Our results reveal that firm size and
firm age are relevant variables to explain why Eu-
ropean SMEs obtain bank loans, whereas only firm
size is relevant for trade credit, with the largest firms
having a higher probability of receiving trade credit.
Regarding the dependency between the two sources
of finance, we find that bank financing and trade
credit are complementary rather than substitutive.
We also find differences in loan application success
depending on the sector in which an SME is active.
That is, SMEs in the manufacturing industry have a
significantly higher probability of receiving the re-
quested bank loan or trade credit than SMEs in non-
manufacturing sectors. In terms of country differ-
ences, we find heterogeneity across countries in
terms of the importance of firm age and firm size,
and we point at specific country-level variables that
are important for obtaining credit.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
a review of the literature. In Sect. 3, the data, variables,
and methodology are presented. The main results and
additional analyses are presented in Sect. 4. Concluding
remarks follow in Sect. 5.
2 Literature review and hypothesis development
As stated by Jensen and Meckling (1976), in any lend-
ing situation, information held by the lender and bor-
rower is asymmetric. Information asymmetry refers to
the situation where insiders (the SMEs) are better in-
formed about themselves than outsiders such as banks,
suppliers, investors, and shareholders. Adverse selection
may result from information asymmetries, and it
indicates that lenders find it difficult to distinguish good
borrowers from bad borrowers.3 Credit screening is the
process by which a lender tries to obtain information
about the borrower’s quality, which is indicated, for
example, by liquidity or leverage ratios, in order to
reduce information asymmetries. Yet, insiders often
have no incentive to provide information to outsiders.
Credit screening therefore provides an imperfect image
of a firm’s solvability, because certain aspects, such as
its long-term strategy, future business development, and
the quality of managers or products, do not appear in a
purely financial analysis. SMEs may then be subject to
financing restrictions, in which case SMEs with good
projects may be denied access to finance or are charged
high interest rates (Sharpe 1990).
2.1 Firm size and age as determinants of bank financing
and trade credit
The literature has shown that firm age and firm size are
important determinants of debt access for SMEs. Young
firms experience more problems due to information
asymmetries than older firms, because they have a less
successful track record than older firms due to their
limited accounting history (Diamond 1989; Canton
et al. 2013). Large firms have more diversified project
portfolios and are therefore less risky (Rajan and
Zingales 1995). Small or young firms may also have
less collateral (e.g., fewer tangible assets or capital) to
guarantee that they will be able to repay their debts.
Acquiring information about a debtor’s quality is a
learning process as well, as shown in particular by Rajan
(1992) in her comparison between informed and arm’s
length debt.4 Outsiders may therefore be less likely to
receive positive signals on the quality of young SMEs
than insiders. Furthermore, financing restrictions for
SMEs should be more severe during crisis periods.
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) propose a model in which
firms with different levels of initial capital ask for
funding. They take into account different types of mac-
roeconomic shocks, such as credit crunches, and show
that firms with lower levels of initial capital are hit more
seriously by such global financial restrictions. SMEs in
3 Moral hazard issues occur after the transaction when the agent wants
to maximize its own benefits at the expense of the principal (e.g.,
diverting the funds to bad projects).
4 Arm’s length financing refers to a situation in which the investor has
no other information than public information and a poor capacity to
renegotiate a debt contract (e.g., a bondholder).
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particular, having less capital, are predicted to be more
weakened by such shocks.
Hyytinen and Pajarinen (2008) empirically investi-
gate how a firm’s size and age relate to information
asymmetries. These authors find an inverse link between
a firm’s information opacity (measured from bank rat-
ings) and its age. Interestingly, Hyytinen and Pajarinen
(2008) find no link between information opacity and
firm size. In contrast, Canton et al. (2013) study per-
ceived bank loan accessibility and show that small and
young SMEs perceive more difficulties to obtain bank
loans than larger and older SMEs. Levenson andWillard
(2000) study credit line accessibility from financial in-
stitutions in the USA in the late 1980s. They observe that
6.36% of the SMEs in their sample are unable to obtain
financing and 4.22% choose not even to apply because
they anticipate a denial decision. They also show that
restricted firms are the smallest ones, confirming the
positive link between firm size and loan accessibility.
Robb (2002) confirms that in the USA, younger firms
have a higher probability of being denied when they
apply for a bank loan than older firms. Freel et al.
(2012) report results in the UK suggesting that discour-
aged firms are smaller or lack close relationships with
banks or service firms. Chakravarty and Xiang (2013)
also show that older firms are more likely to apply for
debt financing in developing countries and that strong
relationships with the banking system reinforce this link.
Similar to banks’ screening processes, the provision
of trade credit is influenced by information asymmetries
and one may expect that firms’ age and size also affect
this type of financing. To our knowledge, few papers
have zoomed in on firm size and firm age as determi-
nants of trade credit. García-Teruel andMartínez-Solano
(2010) focus on the determinants of trade credit using
data from seven European countries, and find that
granted trade credit represents, on average, 22% of total
assets. They find positive relationships between firm
size and firm age on the one hand and the trade credit
received by SMEs on the other.
Distinguishing between two firm-level determinants
(firm age and firm size) and two forms of capital (bank
financing and trade credit) results in the following four
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a Firm age is positively related to
application success for bank financing.
Hypothesis 1b Firm size is positively related to
application success for bank financing.
Hypothesis 1c Firm age is positively related to
application success for trade credit.
Hypothesis 1d Firm size is positively related to
application success for trade credit.
2.2 Trade credit versus bank financing
The literature has shown that SMEs may more easily
signal their quality to suppliers of trade credit (Biais
and Gollier 1997) than to banks that use a screening
process. Mian and Smith (1994) mention the exam-
ple of the regular visits of a manufacturer’s sales
representative to its customers. In addition, inputs
(e.g., transacted goods) represent strong collateral in
trade credit transactions: they represent more value
for a supplier than for a bank because the former B…
can repossess the merchandise and resell it on more
favorable terms^ (Mian and Smith 1994, p. 76).
Burkart and Ellingsen (2004, p. 570) highlight a
main difference between cash and inputs considering
the risk of diversion, where diversion is defined as
B… any use of resources which does not maximize
the lenders’ expected returns.^ They argue that cus-
tomers represent less risk for suppliers than for
banks, since it is less easy for customers to divert
inputs than cash: inputs are used for current activi-
ties and are a good collateral of the transaction. This
implies that firms that apply for trade credit should
be less subject to credit constraints. Also, informa-
tion asymmetries and problems of adverse selection
and moral hazard are less severe for trade credit
applications than for bank loan applications
(García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano 2010). Trade
credit suppliers have been found to be less rigid in
their liquidation policies than banks (Huyghebaert
and Van de Gucht 2007).
What is the relationship between bank loan and
trade credit applications? Empirically, Petersen and
Rajan (1997) document that 70% of US SMEs pro-
vide trade credit to their customers and show that
better-quality firms in the USA obtain more trade
credit. However, trade credit is expensive and is
therefore used more intensively by firms that have
restricted access to bank financing. In contrast,
Giannetti et al. (2011) show that US firms receive
trade credit at low cost. Giannetti et al. (2011) also
prove that trade credit and bank lending are more
likely to be complements than substitutes. Receiving
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trade credit can be considered a positive signal that
makes banks less reluctant to lend. Biais and Gollier
(1997, p. 905) theoretically show that, as suppliers
obtain better information on the borrowers’ quality,
the granting of trade credit proves that they accept
bearing the default risk of the buyer and that B… it
has good information about the latter.^ Banks may
then simply observe the access to trade credit to
reduce their own information asymmetry. Casey
and O’Toole (2014) show with European data that
firms that are credit rationed are 9% more likely to
use trade credit. However, contrary to our approach,
they only consider the current usage of trade credit
and not the application outcome. Agostino and
Trivieri (2014) show that banks in Italy take trade
credit information into account when they make
lending decisions, also suggesting a complementary
rather than a substitutive mechanism between the
two sources of finance. In particular, they show that
the positive effect of trade credit financing on
obtaining bank financing is all the more important,
as the relationships with banks are younger.
Our second hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 2 Application success for trade credit is
positively related to application success for bank
financing.
2.3 Role of industries and institutions
The industry of the firms in particular, in the face of
similar prevailing circumstances, may have a relevant
influence on financing choices (Harris and Raviv 1991;
Mian and Smith 1992). Hall et al. (2000) use UK data to
show that capital structure determinants are driven by
the firm’s sector of activity. Previous studies, without
distinguishing between different types of debt, generally
focus on the relationship between sectors and leverage
ratios (Van Der Wijst and Thurik 1993; Jordan et al.
1998). These studies find that firms in manufacturing
sectors that typically have a greater concentration of
tangible assets (e.g., higher liquidation value), have
better access to debt financing. Yet, only a few papers
investigate the relationship between industry and bank
financing. La Rocca et al. (2010) find that firms in
manufacturing sectors use more bank loan financing
and obtain long-term debt more easily, due to lower
information asymmetries.
Some papers show that trade credit terms are deter-
mined by sectors (Ng et al. 1999; Klapper et al. 2012).
Giannetti et al. (2011) also find an influence of sup-
pliers’ sectors on the amount of accounts receivable.
They further differentiate between the type of goods
produced and show that suppliers of differentiated prod-
ucts (unlike standardized ones) have larger accounts
receivable, suggesting that the nature of the inputs influ-
ences suppliers’ trade credit policies. It is more difficult
to break the relationship or to divert these inputs when
the suppliers offer unique products. Taketa and Udell
(2007) analyze SMEs in manufacturing and non-
manufacturing sectors and show that sector determines
an SME’s probability of obtaining the required finance.
Psillaki and Eleftheriou (2015) further confirm that firms
in traditional or manufacturing sectors obtain trade credit
more easily than firms in non-manufacturing industries.
In manufacturing industries processing basic raw mate-
rials, it is easier to repossess and resale the inputs; then,
firms belonging to this sector may have easier access to
external financing. It should be observed that the impor-
tance of age, size, and the application success of the
alternative form of financing is lower due to the reduced
information asymmetries in the manufacturing sector
(Mian and Smith 1992; Psillaki and Eleftheriou 2015).
Because of the described benefits of being active in
the manufacturing sector, we formulate a hypothesis
about differences in the probability of obtaining finance
between manufacturing and non-manufacturing indus-
tries (hypothesis 3). We also hypothesize that informa-
tion symmetries are less of a concern for manufacturing
SMEs such that the positive relationship between age/
size and application success is expected to be negatively
moderated by sector (manufacturing versus non-
manufacturing; hypothesis 4). Similarly, we expect the
positive relationship between application success for
trade credit and bank financing to be negatively moder-
ated by the manufacturing sector (hypothesis 5).
Hypothesis 3 Being active in the manufacturing
sector is positively related to application success
for bank financing and trade credit.
Hypothesis 4 Being active in the manufacturing
sector negatively moderates the positive rela-
tionships between firm age and firm size, and
application success for bank financing and trade
credit.
Hypothesis 5 Being active in the manufacturing
sector negatively moderates the positive
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relationship between application success for trade
credit and application success for bank financing.
Macroeconomic factors have been demonstrated
to determine SME financing choices (e .g. ,
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 2001). The finan-
cial restrictions of SMEs are also influenced by the
quality of the institutions available in a country.
Canton et al. (2013) show that SMEs in countries
with a higher concentration of the banking sector
find it easier to obtain bank financing. Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) study trade credit in
39 countries. They show that a strong banking sys-
tem is associated with a higher availability of trade
credit, whereas the quality of the legal system rein-
forces the use of bank debt relative to trade credit.
The studies in the literature have also analyzed
SME financing restrictions within the context of the
recent financial crisis that began in 2007. Psillaki
and Eleftheriou (2015) compare trade credit and
bank financing in a sample of French SMEs before
and during the financial crisis. Their study only
considers bank loans repayable within 1 year rather
than long-term loans, and they focus only on certain
industries. They show that bank financing acts more
as a complement than as a substitute for trade credit
for some sectors and that this effect is stronger
during a financial crisis. Casey and O’Toole (2014)
discuss cross-country differences in the importance
of financial constraints and the propensity to use
alternative sources of finance when firms are
constrained. According to these authors SMEs from
Bdistressed countries^ did not suffer from more
stringent financing restrictions than SMEs that are
active in countries not severely hit by the crisis. At
the same time, SMEs in these distressed countries
are more likely to apply for alternative financing.
Taketa and Udell (2007) demonstrate that during the
Japanese banking crisis, trade credit and bank fi-
nancing are more complementary than substitutive.
In the present paper, we investigate whether
country-level variables influence the relationship
between firm age and firm size on the one hand,
and application success on the other. Also, we
determine which country-level variables are related
to an SME’s application success for bank loans and
trade credit. Because there is a lack of earlier liter-
ature on these topics, we do not formulate hypoth-
eses here.
3 Data, methodology, and variable definitions
3.1 Dataset
The dataset (Survey on the Access to Finance of
Enterprises (SAFE)) enables a study of the determi-
nants of SMEs’ debt capacity in a multi-country
context. The data are collected using fixed telephone
lines, and respondents are the owner, financial man-
ager/director, or chief financial officer. The SAFE
survey has been conducted in various waves since
2009 on behalf of the Directorate General for Enter-
prise and Industry of the European Commission, in
cooperation with the European Central Bank. Our
analysis considers 12 waves over the period January
2009–September 2014. The original dataset covers
72,849 firm-wave observations for 11 countries:
Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germa-
ny, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, and Portugal.
In total, 26% of the observations in this dataset
reflect applications for debt financing, and 19%
reflect applications for trade credit financing in the
6 months prior to the interview. The sample we use
in the baseline regression analyses consists of ap-
plying firms only (16,687 firm-wave observations in
case of bank loans and 11,562 firm-wave observa-
tions in case of trade credit).5 A subset of firms has
been followed over time for a consecutive number
of time periods; this sample is used for our analysis
of the interrelationship between the two sources of
finance.
3.2 Methodology
We proceed with the following baseline binary probit
model to test hypotheses 1a to 1d, which relate SMEs’
debt capacity to firm age, firm size, and several control
variables:
Pr application successð Þijt ¼ Φ X ijtβ þ ρ j þ τ t
 
ð1Þ
where we use a specification for bank loans and a
specification for trade credit. Furthermore, Φ is the
cumulative normal distribution, and the subscript i
denotes the firm, j denotes the country, and t denotes
5 These samples are a bit smaller than one would expect on the basis of
the numbers presented above. This is related to the fact that the
question on application success (see below) was not answered or
because of missing values for the control variables.
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the wave. β is Kx1 and Xijt is the ijtth firm observa-
tion on K explanatory variables (including firm age
and firm size and control variables; see below for an
overview of the variables). We also include country
dummy variables (ρj), time dummy variables (τt),
and industry controls in all regressions. To ease
interpretation and enhance comparability across var-
iables and specifications, we report marginal effects
(at the means of the variables). In some model
specifications, we replace the country dummy vari-
ables with specific country-level variables (see
below).
We extend Eq. 1 to test hypothesis 2 by adding a
variable measuring an SME’s success in applying for
trade credit in the bank loan specification. Similarly, we
add a variable measuring an SME’s success in applying
for bank loans in the trade credit specification. These
two application success variables (to test hypothesis 2)
are defined by the outcomes observed in the previous
wave. Information about application (success) for the
previous wave is available for a subset of SMEs which
enables us to link application success in the previous
period to application success in the current period.
To test hypotheses 3, we focus on the estimates of the
marginal effects for a variable reflecting the manufactur-
ing sector (value 1 for manufacturing, and value 0 for all
non-manufacturing sectors). Hypothesis 4 is tested by
adding interaction terms between the manufacturing
sector and firm age/size. Hypothesis 5 is tested by
adding an interaction term between the manufacturing
sector and lagged application success.
3.3 Variable definitions
In line with the earlier literature (e.g., Biais and
Gollier 1997; Burkart and Ellingsen 2004), we con-
sider the determinants of application success for bank
loans and for trade credit separately. That is, the first
dependent variable focuses on bank loans (applica-
tion success bank financing), whereas the second
dependent variable focuses on trade credit (applica-
tion success trade credit). We focus on the following
question about the successfulness of an SME’s appli-
cation for bank financing and trade credit: BIf you
applied for and tried to negotiate for this type of
financing over the past 6 months, did you receive
all the financing you requested, did you receive only
part of the financing you requested, or did you re-
ceive it only at unacceptable costs or terms and
conditions so you did not take it, or did you receive
nothing at all?^ Both variables take a value of 1 if the
answer is Bapplied and got everything^ or Bapplied
but only got part of it,^ and a value of 0 if the answer
is Bapplied but refused because cost too high^ or
Bapplied but was rejected.^
Table 1 presents the acceptance rates for bank
financing and trade credit financing, defined as the
percentage of successful requests (applied and got
everything and applied but only got part of it versus
all requests). The mean acceptance rate was approx-
imately 67.4% for SMEs that applied for bank fi-
nancing and 65.4% for SMEs that applied for trade
credit financing.
Table 1 Application (success)
information for bank financing
and trade credit for each country
Note: These data refer to the en-
tire sample of firms that have ap-
plied for bank loans and/or for
trade credit financing
Country SMEs that
applied for
bank financing
Application success
for bank financing
(as % of SMEs that
applied)
SMEs that applied
for trade credit
Application success
for trade credit
(as % of SMEs
that applied)
Austria 902 0.833 366 0.842
Belgium 1159 0.792 427 0.696
Estonia 2130 0.540 663 0.597
Finland 3207 0.835 3025 0.888
France 679 0.806 554 0.661
Germany 3181 0.817 858 0.846
Greece 1078 0.387 1212 0.394
Ireland 564 0.489 1185 0.647
Italy 3225 0.633 2642 0.722
Netherlands 503 0.467 378 0.513
Portugal 859 0.638 708 0.675
Total 17,487 0.674 12,018 0.654
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The vector Xijt of Eq. 1 contains firm age, firm size,
and the firm-level control variables. Dummy variables
capture the impact of firm age: age < 2 is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the firm was founded fewer than
2 years ago (used as the reference category in our
analyses); age 2–5 is equal to 1 if the firm age is
between 2 and 5 years; age 6–10 is equal to 1 if the
firm age is between 6 and 10 years; age > 10 equals 1 if
the firm is older than 10 years.
For firm size, the following variables are included:
employees 1–9 takes a value of 1 for micro firms with 1–
9 employees (used as the reference category in our
analyses); employees 10–49 takes a value of 1 for small
firms with 10–49 employees; and employees 50–249
takes a value of 1 for medium-sized firms with 50–249
employees.6
We include a set of control variables in the regres-
sions. First, we include profit growth to capture the
impact of the firm’s performance on application success.
The variable profit growth takes a value of 1 if a firm’s
profit has increased over the past 6 months (Casey and
O’Toole 2014), and 0 otherwise. To capture ownership,
we use dummy variables for each type of ownership.We
distinguish among: (a) public shareholders, (b) family or
entrepreneurs, (c) other firms, (d) venture capital firms/
individual investors, (e) single ownership, and (f) an-
other type of ownership. Previous studies find that own-
ership structure has an impact on access to bank loans
(Canton et al. 2013) and trade credit (Psillaki and
Eleftheriou 2015). To control for the industry in our
baseline model, we distinguish among four industries:
manufacturing, construction, trade, and services (note
that for hypotheses 3–5, the non-manufacturing sectors
will be merged into one category).7 We also control for
wave effects by including dummy variables.
Data on country-specific variables are taken from the
World Bank website for the years 2008 to 2013 (the
country-specific variables are measured 1 year prior to
the actual wave of the survey). First, following
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001), we consider
the growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP growth)
because firms in fast-growing economies may be more
in need of credit than firms in non-expanding econo-
mies. We also use variables to measure financial devel-
opment and the size of the real sector that previous
studies have found to predict the use of external finance
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 2001). Furthermore,
we consider two proxies for the development of the
financial system that may influence a firm’s capacity
to access external capital. We use domestic credit pro-
vided to the private sector as a percentage of GDP
(Ln(domestic credit)) and the number of commercial
bank branches per 100,000 adults (Ln(bank branches)).
Finally, to measure the size of the real sector, we use the
ratio of trade to GDP (trade) and the variable inflation to
control for price distortions.
4 Results
A correlation matrix for the firm-level independent and
control variables is provided in Table 2. The low corre-
lations between variables generate no serious concerns
with regard to multicollinearity. Table 2 also presents
descriptive statistics for the entire sample of firms that
applied for bank and trade credit financing.
4.1 Main results
Models 1 and 2 of Table 3 present the baseline results
with application success bank financing and application
success trade credit as the dependent variables, respec-
tively. There are notable differences in the determinants
of application success for each type of financing. When
we consider model 1, we observe that firm age and firm
size are significantly and positively related to the prob-
ability of application success for bank financing. Hence,
older and larger SMEs are significantly more likely to
receive the requested bank loan than younger and small-
er SMEs. Specifically, the impact of firm age is signif-
icant and positive for SMEs that have been in existence
for at least 6 years. Concerning firm size, firms with at
least ten employees have a significantly higher proba-
bility of retrieving their requested bank loan than micro
firms (one to nine employees). In particular, the differ-
ences in application success for bank finance are signif-
icant and more marked for firms having more than 50
employees versus micro firms (the probability of receiv-
ing the requested bank loan is 8 percentage points higher
for firms with between 50 and 249 employees than for
firms with between 1 and 9 employees).
6 We do not include a continuous specification for age and employees
because such a continuous measure is not available for each wave.
7 Several previous studies include tangibility in examining financial
decisions, but this variable was not available. Gompers (1995) shows
that tangibility and industry sector are correlated. This implies that
industry variables can also be a proxy for the agency problems arising
in a firm.
252 G. Andrieu et al.
T
ab
le
2
D
es
cr
ip
tiv
e
st
at
is
tic
s
an
d
co
rr
el
at
io
n
m
at
ri
x
O
bs
.
M
ea
n
SD
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1.
Fi
rm
ag
e
<
2
17
,0
54
0.
02
1
0.
14
4
1.
00
0
2.
Fi
rm
ag
e
2–
5
17
,0
54
0.
06
1
0.
24
0
−
0.
03
9*
1.
00
0
3.
Fi
rm
ag
e
6–
10
17
,0
54
0.
12
9
0.
33
5
−
0.
05
8*
−
0.
11
0*
1.
00
0
4.
Fi
rm
ag
e
>
10
17
,0
54
0.
78
9
0.
40
8
−
0.
26
4*
−
0.
50
4*
−
0.
73
6*
1.
00
0
5.
E
m
pl
oy
ee
s
1–
9
17
,4
87
0.
28
4
0.
45
1
0.
08
0*
0.
11
5*
0.
10
8*
−
0.
18
5*
1.
00
0
6.
E
m
pl
oy
ee
s
10
–4
9
17
,4
87
0.
38
4
0.
48
6
−
0.
04
2*
−
0.
04
4*
−
0.
03
5*
0.
06
9*
−
0.
59
7*
1.
00
0
7.
E
m
pl
oy
ee
s
50
–2
49
17
,4
87
0.
33
3
0.
47
1
−
0.
04
4*
−
0.
08
0*
−
0.
08
3*
0.
13
2*
−
0.
46
4*
−
0.
43
3*
1.
00
0
8.
Pr
of
it
gr
ow
th
17
,1
50
0.
23
5
0.
42
4
0.
02
3*
0.
03
0*
0.
02
1*
−
0.
04
4*
−
0.
07
8*
0.
01
3*
0.
07
3*
1.
00
0
9.
O
w
n:
pu
bl
ic
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
17
,4
37
0.
02
6
0.
15
9
−
0.
00
3
0.
00
0
−
0.
00
0
0.
00
1
−
0.
08
6*
−
0.
00
8*
0.
10
5*
0.
02
0*
1.
00
0
10
.O
w
n:
fa
m
ily
/e
nt
re
pr
en
eu
rs
17
,4
37
0.
59
3
0.
49
1
−
0.
04
3*
−
0.
05
6*
−
0.
05
4*
0.
09
3*
−
0.
09
4*
0.
08
3*
0.
01
4*
−
0.
04
1*
−
0.
19
3*
1.
00
0
11
.O
w
n:
ot
he
r
fi
rm
s
17
,4
37
0.
10
1
0.
30
1
0.
00
6
0.
00
8*
0.
02
1*
−
0.
02
4*
−
0.
14
6*
0.
00
0
0.
16
4*
0.
03
8*
−
0.
06
1*
−
0.
36
9*
12
.O
w
n:
ve
nt
ur
e
ca
pi
ta
lf
ir
m
s
17
,4
37
0.
01
1
0.
10
4
−
0.
00
3
0.
01
2*
0.
00
7
−
0.
01
2*
−
0.
05
2*
−
0.
00
3
0.
06
2*
0.
01
6*
−
0.
01
9*
−
0.
11
3*
13
.O
w
n:
pe
rs
on
17
,4
37
0.
25
3
0.
43
5
0.
04
8*
0.
05
6*
0.
04
5*
−
0.
08
7*
0.
26
0*
−
0.
08
5*
−
0.
19
8*
0.
00
7
−
0.
11
6*
−
0.
70
1*
14
.O
w
n:
ot
he
rs
17
,4
37
0.
01
6
0.
12
7
−
0.
00
7*
−
0.
00
9*
−
0.
00
2
0.
01
0*
−
0.
05
1*
−
0.
00
6
0.
06
3*
0.
00
6
−
0.
02
5*
−
0.
15
1*
15
.S
ec
to
r:
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
17
,4
87
0.
29
9
0.
45
8
−
0.
03
5*
−
0.
04
7*
−
0.
07
3*
0.
10
1*
−
0.
23
1*
0.
03
1*
0.
22
5*
0.
03
7*
0.
02
2*
0.
07
0*
16
.S
ec
to
r:
co
ns
tr
uc
tio
n
17
,4
87
0.
11
3
0.
31
7
−
0.
01
2*
−
0.
00
6
−
0.
00
2
0.
00
9*
−
0.
00
1
0.
03
7*
−
0.
04
0*
−
0.
03
7*
−
0.
01
6*
0.
00
7*
17
.S
ec
to
r:
tr
ad
e
17
,4
87
0.
26
3
0.
44
0
0.
01
3*
0.
01
2*
−
0.
00
5
−
0.
00
8*
0.
14
4*
−
0.
01
7*
−
0.
14
3*
−
0.
03
5*
−
0.
01
5*
0.
01
1*
18
.S
ec
to
r:
se
rv
ic
es
17
,4
87
0.
32
5
0.
46
8
0.
02
7*
0.
03
4*
0.
07
2*
−
0.
08
9*
0.
07
4*
−
0.
03
6*
−
0.
04
3*
0.
02
3*
0.
00
5
−
0.
07
8*
19
.G
D
P
gr
ow
th
17
,4
87
−
0.
66
8
3.
92
3
0.
01
7*
−
0.
01
7*
−
0.
00
3
0.
00
7
−
0.
01
1*
−
0.
00
3
0.
01
6*
0.
03
8*
−
0.
03
1*
−
0.
03
9*
20
.L
n
(d
om
es
tic
cr
ed
it)
17
,4
87
4.
51
3
0.
20
7
−
0.
00
6
−
0.
01
7*
0.
00
7*
0.
00
6
0.
02
4*
0.
00
2
−
0.
02
9*
−
0.
03
8*
0.
01
5*
0.
08
3*
21
.L
n
(b
an
k
br
an
ch
es
)
17
,4
87
3.
24
3
0.
59
3
−
0.
03
3*
0.
00
4
0.
00
6
0.
00
4
0.
03
9*
0.
00
9*
−
0.
05
3*
−
0.
08
8*
0.
02
9*
0.
14
3*
22
.T
ra
de
17
,4
87
1.
69
5
4.
93
3
0.
02
8*
−
0.
00
3
−
0.
01
6*
0.
00
6
−
0.
01
1*
0.
00
4
0.
00
7*
0.
11
4*
−
0.
01
3*
−
0.
07
7*
23
.I
nf
la
tio
n
17
,4
87
1.
74
3
1.
55
8
0.
00
4
0.
03
3*
0.
00
3
−
0.
02
4*
−
0.
03
4*
−
0.
00
7
0.
04
5*
0.
03
3*
−
0.
01
6*
−
0.
07
3*
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
11
.O
w
n:
ot
he
r
fi
rm
s
1.
00
0
12
.O
w
n:
ve
nt
ur
e
ca
pi
ta
lf
ir
m
s
−
0.
03
6*
1.
00
0
13
.O
w
n:
pe
rs
on
−
0.
22
1*
−
0.
06
8*
1.
00
0
14
.O
w
n:
ot
he
rs
−
0.
04
8*
−
0.
01
5*
−
0.
09
1*
1.
00
0
15
.S
ec
to
r:
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
0.
05
4*
0.
02
2*
−
0.
12
6*
−
0.
00
2
1.
00
0
16
.S
ec
to
r:
co
ns
tr
uc
tio
n
−
0.
02
7*
−
0.
01
7*
0.
02
6*
−
0.
01
9*
−
0.
20
2*
1.
00
0
17
.S
ec
to
r:
tr
ad
e
−
0.
05
3*
−
0.
01
8*
0.
04
3*
−
0.
03
4*
−
0.
35
3*
−
0.
21
8*
1.
00
0
18
.S
ec
to
r:
se
rv
ic
es
0.
01
8*
0.
00
9*
0.
05
5*
0.
04
5*
−
0.
43
5*
−
0.
26
9*
−
0.
46
9*
1.
00
0
19
.G
D
P
gr
ow
th
0.
01
8*
−
0.
00
3
0.
04
3*
−
0.
00
0
0.
00
3
0.
00
8*
−
0.
05
3*
0.
04
2*
1.
00
0
20
.L
n
(d
om
es
tic
cr
ed
it)
−
0.
05
9*
−
0.
01
5*
−
0.
05
4*
0.
00
3
−
0.
02
0*
−
0.
01
0*
0.
05
3*
−
0.
02
4*
−
0.
26
9*
1.
00
0
21
.L
n
(b
an
k
br
an
ch
es
)
−
0.
06
4*
−
0.
01
2*
−
0.
12
1*
−
0.
00
2
0.
06
5*
−
0.
01
4*
0.
02
1*
−
0.
06
8*
−
0.
19
6*
0.
22
1*
1.
00
0
22
.T
ra
de
0.
00
4
0.
01
1*
0.
07
8*
0.
01
8*
−
0.
02
7*
−
0.
00
9*
−
0.
01
7*
*
0.
04
6*
0.
19
1*
0.
02
2*
−
0.
30
4*
1.
00
0
23
.I
nf
la
tio
n
0.
01
6*
−
0.
00
1
0.
07
6*
−
0.
00
3
0.
01
1*
0.
00
8*
−
0.
07
0*
0.
04
9*
0.
14
5*
−
0.
23
5*
−
0.
25
6*
−
0.
11
5*
1.
00
0
N
ot
es
:
Fo
r
th
e
de
sc
ri
pt
io
n
of
th
e
va
ri
ab
le
s,
se
e
S
ec
t.
3.
W
e
es
tim
at
e
th
es
e
co
rr
el
at
io
ns
us
in
g
th
e
en
tir
e
sa
m
pl
e
of
fi
rm
s
th
at
ha
ve
ap
pl
ie
d
fo
r
ba
nk
lo
an
s
an
d/
or
fo
r
tr
ad
e
cr
ed
it
fi
na
nc
in
g
*5
%
—
le
ve
lo
f
si
gn
if
ic
an
ce
Bank debt and trade credit for SMEs in Europe: firm-, industry-, and country-level determinants 253
These results are consistent with the first two hypoth-
eses (1a and 1b). Overall, the results suggest that banks
consider an Bage threshold^ when they screen firms.
Both firm size variables have significant coefficients in
our bank loan specification.
In contrast, the trade credit model (model 2; applica-
tion success trade credit) reveals a significant and pos-
itive impact only for firm size (SMEs with at least 50
employees). Hypothesis 1c is not supported whereas
hypothesis 1d is partially supported. These results are
in line with García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano (2010),
who find a significant impact of firm size on received
trade credit.8
To investigate hypothesis 2, we examine the link
between success in obtaining one source of finance
and a previous success in obtaining the alternative
source of finance.
Based on contingency tables and statistical tests
for independence (Appendix 1 and Appendix 2), we
find a general dependency between bank loan and
trade credit application success for a subsample of
firms that applied for both types of financing. SMEs
that applied for and obtained one type of financing
also applied for and obtained the alternative type of
financing. At the same time, firms that failed to
obtain one type of financing were unsuccessful in
obtaining the alternative type of financing.
We use a binary probit model to empirically in-
vestigate the relationship between the two types of
financing, and we focus on the subsample of SMEs
that applied for both types of finance in consecutive
waves. Models 3 and 4 of Table 3 present these
results. It turns out that trade credit application suc-
cess in the previous period significantly and posi-
tively predicts bank loan application success in the
current period (model 3). Also, bank loan applica-
tion success in the previous period significantly and
positively predicts trade credit application success in
the current period (model 4). Hence, creditors con-
sider previous application success in assessing a
current application. It seems that by reducing the
sample of firms to only those that had been involved
in both types of access to external finance, one form
of financing is affected by the other. These results
confirm hypothesis 2 on the complementary effect
between trade credit and bank financing application
success.
In the last four models of Table 3, we add country
variables to the regression specifications to control
for specific macroeconomic conditions. Specifically,
we find that GDP growth is significantly and posi-
tively associated with the probability of obtaining
bank financing and trade credit. The first proxy for
financial development, Ln(domestic credit), is sig-
nificantly and positively related to the probability of
obtaining bank financing. The second proxy,
Ln(bank branches), is significantly and positively
associated with the probability of obtaining trade
credit. Globally, this finding implies that countries
with an efficient financial system are, on average,
characterized by a favorable financial environment
for SMEs. Finally, trade and inflation play a signif-
icant role for trade credit application success rather
than bank loan application success.
Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 are tested in Table 4.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 replace the industry
dummies from Table 3 with a manufacturing versus
non-manufacturing dummy variable. Overall, we
find that firms in the manufacturing industry have
a significantly higher probability of obtaining exter-
nal financing, confirming hypothesis 3. Following
Taketa and Udell (2007), Table 4 adds interaction
terms between the manufacturing sector on the one
hand, and firm age (columns 3 and 4), firm size
(columns 3 and 4) and lagged application success
(columns 5 and 6) on the other hand. The results
show the importance of the manufacturing sector in
shaping the magnitude of the baseline relationships.
The relationship between firm age and an SME’s
application success for bank financing and trade
credit is negatively moderated by the manufacturing
industry.9 For firm size, we do not find a moderation
8 However, our empirical focus is different because García-Teruel and
Martínez-Solano (2010) consider the level of trade credit rather than
direct experiences with bank loan and trade credit applications.
9 Additional Wald tests in column 3 of Table 4 reveal that the sum of
the coefficients of the age dummy variables and the interaction terms
lead to non-significance for age 6–10 and age > 10, and a significant
negative coefficient for age 2–5 (p value < 0.10). For trade credit
(Column 4) we find significant negative coefficients for age 2–5, age
6–10, and non-significance for age > 10. In sum, there is some
evidence that younger SMEs in the manufacturing sector have a higher
likelihood of obtaining credit than older SMEs. To further check the
robustness of our findings, we provide an analysis by partitioning the
sample of firms into non-manufacturing and manufacturing firms. We
find that the relationships between firm age/size and application out-
comes are weaker in the manufacturing sector than in the non-
manufacturing sectors. For reasons of brevity, these results are not
tabulated but are available upon request.
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effect for either type of financing; hence, hypothesis
4 is partially supported. We do not find significant
coefficients of the interaction terms between the
manufacturing dummy and application success in
obtaining the alternative form of financing. Thus,
hypothesis 5 is not supported. In sum, our sector-
specific analysis highlights the role of industries in
the context of appl ica t ion success : in the
manufacturing sector, suppliers consider the value
of the inputs delivered to be strong collateral (Biais
and Gollier 1997; Mian and Smith 1992 and Mian
and Smith 1994).
Finally, we investigate differences at the country
level. Therefore, Table 5 shows the marginal effects of
firm age and firm size for the 11 countries. Control
variables as in Table 3 are also included. Clearly, there
is large heterogeneity in terms of the importance of firm
age and firm size for application success. These country-
by-country results appear to be in line with earlier anal-
yses in the European economic environment (Casey and
O’Toole 2014) that find strong heterogeneity across
countries. In particular, for bank financing (Table 5
(bank financing)), the marginal effects of firm age are
statistically significant mainly in German legal-origin
countries such as Austria, Estonia, and Germany. Firm
size is important for bank loan application success in
seven out of 11 countries. Concerning trade credit (Ta-
ble 5 (trade credit)), an impact of firm age is generally
absent while for firm size we find a significant impact
for Belgium, Greece, Italy, and the Netherlands.10
4.2 Additional analyses
Sample selection and discouraged borrowers Models 1
and 2 in Table 6 show the results for binary probit
models with sample selection that consist of an outcome
equation (application success) and a selection equation
(applying or not).11 For model identification, it is
necessary to include a variable that is correlated with
the decision to apply, but not for application success.We
use the variableD_subsidiaries, which takes a value of 1
if a firm claims to be Bpart of a profit-oriented enterprise
(e.g., a subsidiary or branch) not making autonomous
financial decisions,^ and 0 otherwise. For subsidiary
firms, we expect a low probability of applying for
external financing, which is verified in a single equation
probit model with the decision to apply as the dependent
variable. We also find that this variable is not signifi-
cantly associated with an SME’s access to external
finance. Importantly, the coefficients for the outcome
equation (application success)12 are in line with our
previous results. In addition, we find that the error terms
of both equations in the sample selection model are not
significantly correlated (p values > 0.10 for both depen-
dent variables). Hence, selection does not seem to be a
concern in our case.
To further check the robustness of our findings,
we take into account discouraged borrowers. Kon
and Storey (2003) develop a theory that predicts that
good and bad borrowers can become discouraged
due to information asymmetry and application costs.
Empirical studies have examined discouragement in
the case of bank loan applications (Levenson and
Willard 2000; Han et al. 2009; Freel et al. 2012;
Chakravarty and Xiang 2013). To assess the role of
discouragement, we use the definition of Freel et al.
(2012, p. 400): B… firms that chose not to apply for
fear of rejection^. According to this definition, we
re-estimate models 1 and 2 of Table 6 and consider
the fact that SMEs that did not apply because of a
fear of rejection. This implies that in the selection
equation, the dependent variable has a value of 1 if
the firm applied for external financing and 0 if the
firm did not apply because of a fear of rejection
(these are the discouraged borrowers). Models 3
and 4 in Table 6 show the results. Overall, qualita-
tively similar results are found.
Ordered probit model Appendix 3 (models 1 and 2)
shows the results of ordered probit regressions to
account for the ordered nature of our dependent
variables. The dependent variable in this case takes
a value of 3 if the firm received all financing
10 In a further analysis, we also consider the relationship between the
two types of financing for each country. The results (which are not
reported) confirm a positive relation between bank loans and trade
credit financing. Too few observations in the panel data were available
for each country. This implies that, to obtain an estimate of the
relationship, we run a simple regression model with the response
variable y as one type of financing and the predictor variable x as the
other type of financing in the previous period.
11 The related survey question on the decision to apply was as follows:
BFor each of the following ways of financing, could you please indicate
whether you applied for them over the past 6 months, or if you did not
apply because you thought you would be rejected, because you had
sufficient internal funds, or you did not apply for other reasons?^
12 For brevity, the results for the selection equation (applied yes/no) are
not tabulated but are available upon request.
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(100%), a value of 2 if it received most financing
(75–99%), a value of 1 if it received some financing
(1–74%) and a value of 0 if it received no financing
(0%). The coefficients we obtain for firm age and
firm size confirm our previous results. We find that,
where significant, the coefficients are positive,
underlining that the very small (one to nine em-
ployees) and very young (age < 2) firms are less
able to obtain debt financing.
Firm size We also consider a different measure of
firm size. We re-perform our analysis in Appendix 3
(models 3 and 4) using annual turnover instead of
the number of employees (distinguishing between
turnover < 2 million euros, Turnover 2–10 million
euros, and Turnover 11–50 million euros). The find-
ings are qualitatively similar to the results of models
1 and 2 in Table 3.
Application decision and current usage of bank and
trade credit We applied an additional analysis to
check the relationship between the decision to
apply for bank financing and its current usage
and between the decision to apply for trade credit
and its current usage. Each of these variables of
current usage is binary and takes the value of 1 if
the firm used it in the past 6 months and 0
otherwise. Significant results are found for vari-
ables that measure the current usage of debt fi-
nancing. Firms that are experienced with the use
of bank and trade credit are more likely to ask for
financing. Specifically, we find that firms that are
experienced with bank loans are 21.8% more like-
ly to ask for bank financing and that firms that are
experienced with trade credit are 31.2% more like-
ly to ask for trade credit. The results are statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level (complete tables
are available upon request). This implies that re-
cent lending experiences can Bboost^ future access
to external financing.
5 Discussion and conclusion
We use the SAFE database (2009–2014) from the
European Commission, which includes financial da-
ta for SMEs (fewer than 250 employees). We ana-
lyze outcomes of SME applications for bank loans
and trade credit. Bank loans are the largest source of
finance among SMEs (Petersen and Rajan 1994). At
the same time, SMEs are dependent on alternative
sources of finance, such as trade credit, given their
restricted track record and reputation (Berger and
Udell 1998; Petersen and Rajan 1997).
There are two major outcomes of the present study.
First, we find that the probabilities of receiving trade
credit or a bank loan have different determinants. Sec-
ond, we demonstrate the dependency between the two
sources of finance.
Regarding the determinants of receiving a bank loan
and trade credit, we find that older and larger SMEs are
more likely to receive bank financing, while the results are
less convincing for trade credit. That is, firm age is unre-
lated to the probability of receiving trade credit, and for
firm size, there is no significant difference in the probabil-
ity of receiving trade credit for the smallest firms (less than
ten employees) and those between 10 and 49 employees.
A relatively small marginal effect is found for the largest
SMEs. Our results suggest a different screening process
between the two financing options. The relationships with
suppliers of credit and information asymmetries play a
more substantial role for bank loans than for trade credit.
Future research should reveal whether this is indeed the
case by using continuous measures of firm age and firm
size and measures of information asymmetries (Hyytinen
and Pajarinen 2008).
We also add to the literature in terms of the interrela-
tionship between sources of finance. Our results confirm
that trade credit and bank financing are complementary
rather than substitutive. That is, in our specification, we
take account of an SME’s successful application for bank
finance in the past when using application success for trade
credit as the dependent variable. At the same time, a
successful application for trade credit in the past was added
to the model with application success for bank finance as
the dependent variable. We find a significant positive
coefficient for the lagged variable in either case, which
points to a complementarity effect between the two sources
of finance. In other words, a successful application for
either source of finance is beneficial for an SME’s chance
of receiving the other source of finance. The provision of
finance through either source can be seen as a signal
lenders use when deciding whether or not to grant financ-
ing (Giannetti et al. 2011; Psillaki and Eleftheriou 2015;
Agostino and Trivieri 2014).
This study also focuses on the determinants of receiv-
ing bank loans and trade credit at the industry level and
country level. We find that application success is greater
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for SMEs in the manufacturing sector compared with
SMEs in the other sectors, and that firm age and firm
size have less profound impacts on application outcomes
in the manufacturing sector than in non-manufacturing
sectors. Regarding differences across countries, we find
the following. While a significant relationship between
firm age and access to bank loans is found in our main
sample, a country-specific analysis reveals statistical sig-
nificance in a few countries only. Despite the relatively
small and varying sample sizes across countries, we
believe this is an indication of heterogeneity across coun-
tries in terms of the importance of firm age and firm size
for application success for bank loans and trade credit.
These findings are consistent with recent cross-country
empirical studies (Casey and O’Toole 2014). Finally, our
analysis reveals different country-level determinants of
bank loan and trade credit application success.
In addition to the possible avenues for future research
described above, further empirical analysis, with the in-
clusion of credit scores or ratings, should reveal whether
it is indeed the case that only good creditors are granted
access to additional amounts of credit. Such research
could also include objective financial indicators of SMEs
that were unavailable for the present study. For example,
we included a subjective measure of profit growth in our
analyses, whereas previous research pointed to profit or
assets as being important in lending decisions. Another
limitation is the restricted size of the panel dataset. With
more waves becoming available in the coming years, it
will be possible to analyze the dynamics of SME
Table 5 Application success, firm age, and firm size across countries (marginal effects are shown)
Country Firm age at 2–5 Firm age at 6–10 Firm age at > 10 Employees 10–49 Employees 50–249 Obs McFadden’s R2
Bank financing
Austria 0.028 0.204** 0.146* − 0.003 0.042 824 0.054
Belgium 0.022 0.007 0.044 0.092*** 0.081** 1113 0.084
Estonia 0.015 0.119* 0.142** 0.106*** 0.141*** 1940 0.073
Finland 0.012 − 0.015 0.028 0.020 0.028 3095 0.051
France 0.134* − 0.190 − 0.155 0.109 − 0.065 656 0.062
Germany 0.022 0.014 0.102** 0.074*** 0.133*** 3040 0.058
Greece − 0.302 − 0.272 − 0.169 − 0.003 0.105** 1056 0.045
Ireland − 0.100 0.007 0.031 0.057 0.050 546 0.061
Italy − 0.042 0.016 0.042 0.051** 0.056** 3093 0.066
Netherlands − 0.105 0.025 0.091 0.187*** 0.267*** 486 0.110
Portugal − 0.267 − 0.136 − 0.142 0.074* − 0.005 833 0.069
Trade credit
Austria 0.041 0.036 0.055 − 0.029 0.066 318 0.105
Belgium 0.268 0.088 0.163 0.112** 0.194*** 417 0.069
Estonia − 0.022 0.013 0.068 0.028 0.021 587 0.100
Finland 0.002 − 0.012 0.019 0.006 0.023 2922 0.045
France 0.064 0.191 0.225 − 0.001 0.019 522 0.131
Germany 0.012 0.026 − 0.009 0.014 0.016 814 0.043
Greece − 0.234 0.263* − 0.163 0.027 0.129*** 1198 0.046
Ireland − 0.131 0.013 0.032 − 0.044 0.061 1150 0.055
Italy − 0.037 0.021 0.028 0.042* 0.039** 2521 0.065
Netherlands 0.159 0.017 0.170 0.117* 0.201*** 368 0.067
Portugal 0.057 0.044 0.030 0.070 − 0.033 687 0.049
Notes: For the description of the variables, see Sect. 3. Marginal effects calculated at the means are presented. All of the other variables and
controls (not tabulated), included in Table 3, are enclosed. Reference categories: age, < 2; employees, 1–9; ownership, single person; sector,
services
*10%, **5%, ***1%—levels of significance
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financing more narrowly and to apply more-advanced
panel data techniques.
A clear avenue for further research is the integration of
other forms of finance. For example, Cosh et al. (2009)
examine the determinants of capital obtained from several
forms of financing, such as venture capital, hire purchase
or leasing, factoring, and invoice discounting. Moritz et al.
(2016) and Masiak et al. (2017) use a cluster analysis
approach and identify several SMEs’ financing profiles.
There are also recent studies that examine the role of
crowdfunding (Ahlers et al. 2015; Colombo et al. 2015)
and the impact of venture capital finance on a firm’s
financial structure (Haro-de-Rosario et al. 2016). Further
research is also needed to develop better proxies for
asymmetric information to improve the analyses of access
to debt financing and the role of dynamics in the lending
relationship (especially for debt financing). For example,
Roberts (2015) shows that the terms of renegotiation (i.e.,
modifications in the contractual constraints) are an integral
part of bank lending that impact the behavior of the
contracting parties. This suggests that the dynamics of
renegotiation throughout the relationship influence the role
of the initial contract terms and, consequently, the initial
accessibility to debt financing. Finally, the analysis of
potentially differential determinants across several forms
of finance can be extended from firm age and firm size to
other variables, such as financial indicators or ownership
structure.
Table 6 Additional analyses: selection model and discouraged firms
(1) Selection model (2) Selection model (3) Selection model and
discouraged firms
(4) Selection model
and discouraged
firms
Application success
bank financing
Application success
trade credit
Application success
bank financing
Application success
trade credit
Firm age
2–5 − 0.0009 (0.019) − 0.0330 (0.023) 0.0016 (0.015) − 0.0310 (0.027)
6–10 0.0376* (0.022) − 0.0214 (0.033) 0.0419* (0.022) 0.0167 (0.027)
> 10 0.081*** (0.022) 0.0155 (0.027) 0.0847*** (0.024) 0.0021 (0.024)
Employees
10–49 0.0405** (0.016) 0.0190 (0.059) |0.0390** (0.019) 0.0432*** (0.011)
50–249 0.0396* (0.022) 0.0788** (0.036) 0.0534* (0.029) 0.0411*** (0.013)
Profit growth 0.0551*** (0.012) 0.0689*** (0.008) 0.0563*** (0.012) 0.0323* (0.017)
Ownership
Public shareholders 0.0367 (0.028) 0.0179 (0.082) 0.0226 (0.032) 0.0327 (0.028)
Family/entrepreneurs 0.0299*** (0.010) 0.0299* (0.021) 0.0302** (0.032) 0.0004 (0.006)
Other firms 0.0515*** (0.014) 0.0408** (0.018) 0.0470*** (0.016) 0.0040 (0.017)
Venture capital firms − 0.0103 (0.023) − 0.0379* (0.043) − 0.0193 (0.027) − 0.0861*** (0.028)
Other 0.0513** (0.017) − 0.0379 (0.067) 0.0459** (0.022) − 0.0136 (0.034)
Sector
Manufacturing − 0.0055 (0.008) 0.0189 (0.079) 0.0004 (0.009) − 0.0123 (0.017)
Construction − 0.0409** (0.017) − 0.0290 (0.073) − 0.0418** (0.017) − 0.0439*** (0.012)
Trade − 0.0014 (0.007) 0.0432 (0.065) − 0.0012 (0.009) 0.0004 (0.014)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 67,366 62,705 21,539 14,195
Censored observations 50,687 51,148 4860 2638
Uncensored observations 16,679 11,557 16,679 11,557
Wald χ2 test (ρ = 0) 0.235 0.773 0.202 0.312
Notes: For the description of the variables, see Sect. 3. Marginal effects calculated at the means are presented. Robust clustered (by country)
standard errors are between parentheses. Reference categories: age, < 2; employees, 1–9; ownership, single person; sector, services
*10%, **5%, ***1%–levels of significance
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In sum, our results of the analyses of the application
decision outcomes of European SMEs add new insights
into their financial restrictions and the way in which
multiple sources of finance are used over time. These
findings may be useful for policymakers who are com-
mitted to encouraging the growth and viability of SMEs.
Our results demonstrate the usefulness of financial data
collection initiatives over time, and future research can
profit from more extensive longitudinal datasets with
the inclusion of a wide array of financial sources.
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Appendix 1
Appendix 2
Table 7 Contingency table for firms that obtain both trade credit
at time t-1 and bank financing at time t
Previous application
success trade
credit = 0
Previous application
success trade
credit = 1
Total
Application success
bank
financing = 0
437 358 795
54.97% 45.03% 100%
65.03% 31.29% 43.78%
Application success
bank
financing = 1
235 786 1021
23.02% 76.98% 100%
34.97% 68.71% 56.22%
Total 672 1144 1816
37% 63% 100%
100% 100% 100%
Pearson chi2 (1) = 195.75 (Pr = 0.000)
Likelihood-ratio chi2 (1) = 197.55 (Pr = 0.000)
Cramer’s V = 0.3283
Fisher’s exact = 0.000
1-sided Fisher’s exact = 0.000
Notes: The relationship between the two types of financing is
analyzed via a contingency table. The tests of statistically signif-
icant independence (Pearson’s chi2 (1), likelihood-ratio, Cramer’s
V, Fisher’s exact) confirm the existence of a strong coherent link
between the two types of financing
Table 8 Contingency table for firms that obtain both trade credit
at time t and bank financing at time t-1
Application success
trade credit = 0
Application success
trade credit = 1
Total
Previous application
success bank
financing = 0
409 361 770
53.12% 46.88% 100%
60.15% 32.46% 42.97%
Previous application
success bank
financing = 1
271 751 1022
26.52% 73.48% 100%
39.85% 67.58% 57.03%
Total 680 1112 1792
37.95% 62.05% 100%
100% 100% 100%
Pearson chi2 (1) = 131.95 (Pr = 0.000)
Likelihood-ratio chi2 (1) = 132.37 (Pr = 0.000)
Cramer’s V = 0.2714
Fisher’s exact = 0.000
1-sided Fisher’s exact = 0.000
Notes: The relationship between the two types of financing is
analyzed via a contingency table. The tests of statistically signif-
icant independence (Pearson’s chi2 (1), likelihood-ratio, Cramer’s
V, Fisher’s exact) confirm the existence of a strong coherent link
between the two types of financing
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Appendix 3
Table 9 Additional analyses (with application success as the dependent variable)
(1) Ordered probit (2) Ordered probit (3) Binary probit (alternative
firm size variable)
(4) Binary probit (alternative
firm size variable)
Application success bank
financing
Application success
trade credit
Application success bank
financing
Application success trade credit
Firm age
2–5 − 0.0801 (0.348) − 0.1406 (0.213) − 0.0033 (0.019) − 0.0175 (0.024)
6–10 0.0869 (0.280) − 0.0906 (0.403) 0.0449* (0.025) 0.0008 (0.033)
> 10 0.2506*** (0.001) 0.0071 (0.946) 0.0943*** (0.026) 0.0288 (0.024)
Employees
10–49 0.2228*** (0.000) 0.0777*** (0.010)
50–249 0.3113*** (0.000) 0.1558*** (0.000)
Turnover
2–10 M 0.0440* (0.025) − 0.0092 (0.013)
11–50 M 0.0750*** (0.02) 0.0455*** (0.017)
Profit growth 0.1885*** (0.000) 0.1955*** (0.000) 0.0657*** (0.008) 0.0620*** (0.009)
Ownership
Public shareholders 0.1387** (0.026) 0.0988 (0.180) 0.0231 (0.0314) 0.0311 (0.034)
Family/entrepreneurs 0.1306*** (0.000) 0.0854*** (0.007) 0.0370*** (0.010) 0.0214** (0.009)
Other firms 0.1534*** (0.000) 0.1291*** (0.006) 0.0480*** (0.018) 0.0333** (0.016)
Venture capital firms − 0.0450 (0.630) − 0.1399 (0.197) − 0.0253 (0.026) − 0.0741** (0.034)
Other 0.2030** (0.011) 0.0114 (0.912) 0.0514** (0.023) − 0.0214 (0.032)
Sector
Manufacturing − 0.0016 (0.951) − 0.0102 (0.750) − 0.0021 (0.011) − 0.00766 (0.017)
Construction − 0.1263*** (0.000) − 0.1410*** (0.001) − 0.0457*** (0.017) − 0.0471*** (0.013)
Trade 0.0149 (0.575) 0.0766** (0.018) − 0.00610 (0.011) 0.0162 (0.014)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 16,687 11,562 16,397 11,415
Log likelihood − 13,289 − 8988 − 9456 − 6916
McFadden's R2 0.067 0.053 0.088 0.062
McKelvey and Zavoina R2 0.170 0.130
Notes: For the description of the variables, see Sect. 3. For the binary probit model (models 3 and 4), marginal effects calculated at the means
are presented. Robust clustered (by country) standard errors are between parentheses. Reference categories: age, < 2; employees, 1–9;
turnover, < 2 million euros; ownership, single person; sector, services
*10%, **5%, ***1%—levels of significance
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